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Charities need to come to mind to enter a potential donor's consideration set. However, feeling familiar with a charity and its cause can facilitate
or impair giving. In most cases, perceived good memory for details of the cause fosters the impression of personal importance, which increases
giving (Studies 1 and 3). But when the charity aims to increase awareness of a cause, good memory for the cause suggests that awareness is already
high, which impairs giving (Studies 2 and 3). Hence, promotions for awareness-raising charities can actually have negative consequences, confirm-
ing the predictions of a metacognitive analysis.
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Common wisdom holds that charities need extensive promo-
tional efforts to foster awareness and receive donations. Text-
books emphasize the importance of promotion for nonprofits
and advocate strategies designed to increase awareness and
knowledge (Kotler & Andreasen, 2000). Scholarly articles
echo this belief with statements like, “To succeed in such a cli-
mate, a charity must rely on an effective promotional strategy”
(Bendapudi, Singh, & Bendapudi, 1996, p. 33). Analysts value
nonprofit brands based in part on media exposure (Cone, 2010).
Indeed, charities require promotion to come to mind and to
enter the consideration set of potential donors. Accordingly, a
key goal of many charities is to achieve high visibility. Unfor-
tunately, some marketing tactics can backfire for charities
(Krishna, 2011) and high visibility and awareness may also☆ We thank Katherine Burson, Jesse Chandler, and the members of the Social
Cognition Lab at the University of Michigan for helpful discussions.
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doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2012.01.001have deleterious consequences. The present research tests this
possibility. It asks under which conditions it helps or hurts a
charity when donors feel that they are well familiar with its
cause.
A metacognitive analysis suggests that being familiar with a
charity and its cause can convey different things to a potential
donor. On one hand, the potential donor may conclude that
the charity is very important to her or else she would not be
familiar with details of its cause and work; on the other hand,
she may conclude from her own familiarity that the charity is
already so well known that her donation will make little differ-
ence. Conversely, being unfamiliar with the charity may con-
vey that one never cared about this cause or, alternatively,
that the charity and its cause are not yet widely known and
therefore in particular need of support. Which of these consid-
erations is likely to dominate may depend on the charity's
goals. Charities that emphasize awareness-raising may be par-
ticularly likely to suffer from the perception that their cause is
already highly familiar, as reflected in one's own good knowl-
edge about it. In contrast, charities that pursue other goals—
such as helping people in need—may benefit from the percep-
tion that one knows their cause well.by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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tures in three experiments. To manipulate potential donors' per-
ception of how much they know about a charity's cause we
present them with memory tests that are easy or difficult to
complete, leaving them with the impression that they remember
quite a lot or very little about the respective charity. Confirming
what most charity officers seem to assume, the impression that
one knows a lot about the cause increases intentions to donate
money and time (Study 1) as well as actual monetary donations
(Study 3) when the charity asks for money to help people in
need. In contrast, the impression that one knows a lot about
the cause decreases intentions to donate money and time
(Study 2) as well as actual monetary donations (Study 3)
when the charity asks for money to raise awareness of its cause.
With regard to charitable giving, these findings draw atten-
tion to the role of metacognitive processes in donors' decision
making and illuminate the conditions under which donors'
sense of familiarity helps or hurts a charity. Most importantly,
they identify a dilemma for charities that aim to raise awareness:
when their cause does not come to mind to begin with, they will
go without donations—but when potential givers believe they
know the cause well, this also reduces donations. For these
charities, extensive promotions may impair charitable giving.
Charities that pursue other goals—such as relieving suffering,
advancing self-reliance, or improving the environment—do
not face this dilemma; for them, extensive promotions are likely
to improve giving. With regard to basic metacognitive processes,
the findings highlight that the samemetacognitive experience can
have either positive or negative implications, depending on the
specifics of the current task and context. We return to these issues
in the discussion.
Theoretical background
Not surprisingly, people are more likely to donate to chari-
ties whose work they find meaningful, important, and relevant
(Sargeant, 1999). Numerous variables can contribute to the
assessment of a charity's personal importance and relevance, in-
cluding its cause (Bennett, 2003; Small & Simonsohn, 2008)
and the donor's past experience with the charity (Sargeant &
Jay, 2004; Sargeant & Woodliffe, 2007). Moreover, people's af-
fective response to a charitable appeal can signal its importance,
resulting in increased donations when the victims are identified
and coherent (Small & Loewenstein, 2003; Smith, Faro, &
Burson, 2011), when the appeal elicits sympathy for the victims
(Small & Verrochi, 2009; Weiner, 1980), or when considerations
of one's own benevolence elicit positive feelings (Manucia,
Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984).
Metacognitive inferences
Here, we draw attention to a different set of variables, namely
potential donors' metacognitive experiences when thinking about
a charity and its cause. Every component of thinking can feel easy
or difficult, from reading new information to recalling material
from memory. What people conclude from experiences of ease
or difficulty depends on which of many lay theories of mentalprocesses they bring to bear (Schwarz, 2004a, 2010; Schwarz,
Song, & Xu, 2009). The most widely studied lay theory of
memory is at the heart of Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) avail-
ability heuristic. It correctly holds that it is easier to recall exam-
ples when many rather than few exist in the world; hence people
infer frequency and typicality from ease of recall (Schwarz et al.,
1991; Tybout, Sternthal, Makaviya, Bakamitsos, & Park, 2005;
Wanke, Bohner, & Jurkowitsch, 1997). However, people hold
many other, usually correct, lay theories of memory. One holds
that we forget over time; hence, people infer that an event oc-
curred more recently, the easier it is to bring to mind (Schwarz
et al., 2009). Another assumes that repetition helps memory;
hence people infer that they heard or saw something more often
when it is easy rather than difficult to recall (Schwarz, Sanna,
Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007; Weaver, Garcia, Schwarz, & Miller,
2007). Similarly, people correctly believe that personally relevant
and important information is remembered better than unimpor-
tant information (Schwarz, 2004b); hence, they infer personal
importance from ease of recall (Schwarz et al., 2009).
Which of these and many other lay theories of memory people
draw on when making a judgment depends on the specific task
and related context variables, reflecting that thinking is for
doing and sensitive to one's current goals in context (Schwarz,
2004a, 2010). We propose that a charity's goal is one of the vari-
ables that influence theory selection when people consider
whether to make a donation or not.
Impact of the charity's goal
Not surprisingly, a charity's goal is a primary characteristic on
which charities are evaluated by potential donors (Sargeant,
1999; Small & Simonsohn, 2008). Even subtle changes in the
framing of the goal can have pronounced effects on donations
(Das, Kerhof, & Kuiper, 2008; Smith et al., 2011) and can elicit
different mind-sets in potential donors (Liu & Aaker, 2008;
Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007). It is therefore very likely
that potential donors attend to the charity's goal when they con-
sider relevant inputs, including the information provided by
their own charity-related metacognitive experiences.
In most cases, the importance of the cause will loom large in
donors' decision making. This, in turn, is likely to bring to
mind an applicable (and correct) lay theory that holds that im-
portant things are better remembered than unimportant ones
(Schwarz et al., 2009). If so, good memory for details of the
cause will suggest that one finds the cause important, a variable
that is known to increase donations (Sargeant, 1999). Hence,
perceived good memory should increase donations under
these conditions. Not so, however, when the charity's goal is
to raise awareness of a cause, such as the need to prevent de-
struction of the rainforest; in this case, noting that one remem-
bers a lot about the cause provides ambiguous information. On
the one hand, it may indicate that one found this cause impor-
tant and paid close attention to it. On the other hand, it may in-
dicate that one has heard about the need to prevent rainforest
destruction many times before, suggesting that it is already an
issue of public discourse. The latter interpretation is consistent
with the (also correct) lay theory that repetition improves
560 R.W. Smith, N. Schwarz / Journal of Consumer Psychology 22 (2012) 558–564memory, which makes good recall an indicator of frequent pre-
vious exposure and high popularity (Schwarz et al., 2007;
Weaver et al., 2007). If potential donors draw the latter infer-
ence, they may donate less when they believe they remember
the charity well—after all, further awareness-raising efforts
may not be needed.
Present research
The present research tests these conjectures. In three studies,
participants read an appeal from a charity and subsequently
take a memory test. Depending on conditions, the memory
test is easy or difficult, leaving test takers with the impression
that they remember a lot versus very little about the charity.
We accomplish this by asking about the same content at differ-
ent levels of detail (e.g., “Did the number of orphans increase or
decrease last year?” versus “By how many did the number of
orphans increase or decrease last year?”); this ensures that the
same issues are salient in all conditions while allowing for var-
iation in the experienced ease of recall. Importantly, random
assignment to an easy or difficult memory test avoids any con-
found between participants' actual memory for the charity and
their metacognitive experience. As noted, the lay theory that
important information is better remembered than unimportant
information is correct—those who find an issue more important
attend more to it and remember more about it (Conway, 1990).
Hence, natural variations in memory performance are inade-
quate for isolating the influence of metacognitive processes,
making experimental manipulations of perceived memory per-
formance the method of choice.
Study 1 uses a charity that helps orphans in Uganda. We pre-
dict, and find, that participants assigned to an easy memory test
intend to donate more to this charity than participants assigned
to a difficult memory test. Study 2 uses a charity that aims to
raise awareness about rain forest destruction. We predict, and
find, that participants assigned to an easy memory test intend
to donate less to this charity than participants assigned to a dif-
ficult memory test. Study 3 uses the same charity, concerned
with childhood heart disease, for both types of goals in a single
design and replicates the results with actual (rather than
intended) monetary donations.
Note that our key prediction is an interaction of the charity's
goal and potential donors' metacognitive experience: thinking
that one remembers well will decrease donations for awareness-
raising charities, but increase donations for other charities.
While many other variables may be plausibly related to one's per-
formance on a memory test and one's willingness to donate
money, these variables predict main effects of test performance
rather than the above interaction. For example, better perfor-
mance on a test may improve one's mood, self-esteem, or the
accessibility of success related thoughts; while these and many
other variables can affect charitable giving (for reviews, see
Bekkers & Wiepking, 2007; Gardner, 1985; Piliavin & Charng,
1990), we are not aware of any alternative theorizing that predicts
that the impact of one's performance on a memory test on chari-
table giving is contingent on whether the charity aims to raise
awareness or pursues another goal.Study 1: The more I remember, the more I give
Study 1 tests whether people donate more to a charity that
aims to relieve suffering the more they seem to remember
about its cause.
Method
45 undergraduates from a large Midwestern University par-
ticipated for course credit. They read a one-page description of
a charity called Children of Uganda, which included a highly
detailed account of the plight of Ugandan orphans and a de-
scription of the charity's numerous activities designed to help
them. To manipulate participants' perceptions of how well
they remember this information, they were randomly assigned
to an easy or difficult memory test. Each test consisted of
seven questions of comparable content, except that the difficult
test asked for more intricate details than the easy test (e.g., the
direction of change in Uganda orphan numbers versus the
quantity of change in Uganda orphan numbers).
Participants were then asked, in an open response format,
“Hypothetically, how much would you be willing to donate to
the Children of Uganda charity?” They also reported their be-
havioral intentions (“I plan on getting involved with this
cause,” and “I plan on telling a friend about this cause”,
1=strongly agree; 7=strongly disagree); these items correlated
r(43)= .634, pb .001, and were averaged to form an intended
involvement index. In addition, participants indicated how dif-
ficult they found the memory test (1=very easy; 7=very
difficult).
Results and discussion
Participants answered more questions correctly on the easy
(M=6.1) than on the difficult test (M=2.67; t(43)=9.6, pb .001).
They were aware of this difference and rated the easy test
(M=3.43) as easier than the difficult one (M=4.75; t(43)=2.7,
p=.01).
We predicted that consumers who believe they remember a
charity well will (i) donate more money and (ii) report a higher
intention to get involved. As is often the case with charitable
donations, the response variable was non-normally distributed
with a large right skew. Accordingly, we follow the widely
used method of analyzing donations with a non-parametric
Mann–Whitney U test on donation–amount–ranks (Andreoni,
1995; Landry, Lange, List, Price, & Rupp, 2006; Lehmann,
1975). As expected, those who took the easy test intended to
donate more than those who took the difficult test (U=151,
p=.02). Removing three outliers ($3000, $30,000, and
$100,000) and conducting a t-test yielded similar results; partic-
ipants who took the easy test reported higher donation inten-
tions (M=$187.11) than those who took the difficult test (M=
$59.67; t(40)=2.02, p=.05). Also as predicted, the former par-
ticipants reported greater intentions to get involved (M=3.62)
than the latter (M=4.46, t(43)=2.25, p=.03).
In sum, participants assigned to an easy memory test
responded more favorably to the charity and its cause than
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memory test manipulated participants' beliefs about how well
they remember the charity, it also illustrates how mere measure-
ment can affect consumer behavior (see also Morwitz &
Fitzsimons, 2004). The finding is compatible with common
wisdom: Potential donors who think they know a lot about a
charity and its cause are more likely to donate, making exten-
sive advertising a crucial element of philanthropic work. Our
theorizing predicts, however, that this wisdom does not apply
when the charity pursues awareness-raising goals. Study 2
tests this prediction.
Study 2: The more I remember, the less I give
Method
135 adults from the online pool MindField completed this
study and others in exchange for payment of $5. They read a
one-page description of The Prince's Rainforest Foundation,
which emphasized the goal of raising awareness of the need
to prevent tropical deforestation. Subsequently, participants
completed either an easy or difficult memory test involving 7
questions of comparable content (e.g. whether the charity's
website has a certain feature versus what year that feature was
launched). Participants then indicated in an open-ended re-
sponse format how much money (dollars) and time (hours)
they would hypothetically be willing to donate.
Participants also rated the difficulty of the test (1=very easy;
7=very difficult) and completed a four-item mood scale
(α=.92) with the ends of 5-point scales labeled: sad/happy,
bad mood/good mood, irritable/pleased, and depressed/cheerful
(Lee & Sternthal, 1999; Swinyard, 1993).
Results and discussion
Participants assigned to the easy memory test answered
more questions correctly (M=5.63) than those assigned to the
difficult test (M=3.29; t(133)=10.15, pb .001). They were
aware of this difference and rated the easy test (M=3.06) as
easier than the difficult one (M=4.21; t(133)=4.42, pb .001).
The donation data was again non-normally distributed and
analyzed with a Mann–Whitney U test on donation–amount–
ranks. As predicted, the previously observed pattern reversed.
Participants who took the difficult memory test intended to
donate more money to help the charity raise awareness (M=
$30.77) than participants who took the easy test (M=$13.63,
U=1571.5, p=.02). An unequal variances t-test yielded similar
results (t(83)=1.94, p=.055). Paralleling this finding, partici-
pants who took the difficult test also reported that they would
donate more hours (M=13.11) than those who took the easy
test (M=6.65, t(114)=2.07, p=.04). These results are opposite
to the results of Study 1, where a difficult memory test was
associated with lower intentions to donate to a charity that pur-
sues a helping goal.
Finally, participants' mood reports showed no difference be-
tween conditions (M's=3.63 and 3.60, t(133)b1, for the easy
and difficult test, respectively). This is consistent with expectations.While test performance can be used as a mood manipulation when
it is framed as success or failure in a test of ability (see Gerrards-
Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 2011), this prerequisite is not satisfied in
the present experiments. Further reducing the plausibility that
mood plays a key role in the present findings, a difficult test was
associated with high donation intentions in Study 2 but low dona-
tion intentions in Study 1, in contrast to the main effect predictions
that follow from diverse mood accounts (for reviews of relevant
mood theories, see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Morris,
1989; Schwarz & Clore, 2007).
Study 3: Behavioral consequences
Studies 1 and 2 point to an important role of metacognitive
inferences in charitable giving decisions. However, the studies
were limited to hypothetical donations of money and time and
the charities used in these studies differed not only in their
goals, but also in the issues they addressed. Study 3 addresses
these ambiguities by soliciting real monetary donations for the
same charity. In all conditions, participants learn about a charity
that seeks to reduce the impact of childhood heart disease; how-
ever, the charity attempts to do so either by raising awareness or
by supporting treatment. Next, participants take an easy or dif-
ficult memory test; the tests are identical across the two charita-
ble goals. Finally, participants have the opportunity to make an
anonymous donation to the charity. This replicates Studies 1
and 2 in a single design with a behavioral outcome variable,
using the same charity in all conditions. We predict that con-
sumers donate more to a charity that emphasizes the provision
of help when perceived memory is good rather than poor, but
more to a charity that emphasizes awareness-raising when per-
ceived memory is poor rather than good.
Method
255 adults from a paid-participant pool in a Midwestern col-
lege town completed this study and others in exchange for a pay-
ment of $15. Participants read a one-page description of Heart 2
Heart, a charity devoted to reducing the impact of childhood
heart disease. There were two versions of this description. The
helping-purpose version emphasized the goal of treating child-
hood heart disease, whereas the awareness-purpose version em-
phasized the goal of raising awareness about childhood heart
disease; the descriptions were identical in all other respects. Par-
ticipants then took either an easy or difficult 7-question memory
test; the tests were identical across charity-purpose conditions and
of comparable content across quiz-difficulty conditions. Finally,
participants had the opportunity to make anonymous monetary
donations by placing their survey and donations in an envelope.
Experimenters delivered all donated money to the charity. In
addition, participants reported how easy or difficult they found
the memory test (1=very easy; 7=very difficult).
Results and discussion
Participants answered more questions correctly when the test





















Awareness Purpose Helping Purpose
Fig. 1. The implications of perceived memory depend on the target. This figure
includes participants who donated $0.
562 R.W. Smith, N. Schwarz / Journal of Consumer Psychology 22 (2012) 558–564pb .001). They were aware of this difference and rated the easy
test (M=4.1) as easier than the difficult one (M=4.91; t(251)=
4.49, pb .001).
Overall, 39% of the participants chose to make a donation.
Due to the prevalence of $0 donations, we used a Tobit
model (Amemiya, 1985; Mitchell & Dacin, 1996) to examine
the extent to which the difficulty of the memory test (easy ver-
sus hard) and the purpose of the charity (helping versus
awareness-raising) affected the amount donated. The Tobit
model was run with zero (no donation) and 8 (highest donation
received) as the lower and upper limits, respectively; see
Table 1 for results. The key finding is the predicted interaction
between the difficulty of the memory test and the purpose of the
charity (β=−2.31, t(251)=−2.58, p= .01), shown in Fig. 1; it
was diagnosed with one-tailed Tobit contrasts. When the char-
ity's helping goal was emphasized, participants donated more
money when the easy quiz conveyed that they remembered
the details well (M=$1.26, SD=1.77) than when the difficult
quiz conveyed that they remembered them poorly (M=$.78,
SD=1.42; β=−1.22, t(124)=−1.87, p=.03). This replicates
Study 1 with real monetary donations. Also as predicted, this
pattern reversed when the charity's awareness-raising goal
was emphasized. In this case, participants donated less when
the easy quiz conveyed that they remembered the details well
(M=$.51, SD=1.06) than when the difficult quiz conveyed
that they remembered them poorly (M=$.85, SD=1.33;
β=1.07, t(127)=1.79, p=.04). This replicates Study 2 with
real monetary donations. Mann–Whitney contrasts yielded sim-
ilar results (p'sb .04).
Three points are worth noting. First, the robust replications
across different charities in Studies 1 to 3 highlight that the crucial
variable is indeed whether the charity pursues an awareness-
raising versus another goal, not the domain of their cause. This
reduces potential concerns about idiosyncratic aspects of the re-
spective charities. Second, the actual monetary donations in this
study were substantially lower than the hypothetical donations
in Studies 1 and 2, while replicating the theoretically predicted
patterns. The difference in the absolute size of hypothetical and
actual donations is consistent with other findings (Murphy,
Allen, Stevens, & Weatherhead, 2005). Third, the memory tests
used in Study 3 were identical under help-providing andTable 1
Tobit coefficients for amount of money donated to charity.
Full model Coefficient t-statistic p-value
Constant −1.83 −3.45 .001
Difficulty (easy=0) 1.13 1.76 .079
Purpose (awareness=0) 1.97 3.13 .002
Difficulty x purpose interaction −2.31 −2.58 .010
Helping Purpose
Constant .061 .14 .89
Difficulty (replicating Study 1) −1.22 −1.87 .032
Awareness Purpose
Constant −1.64 −3.03 .003
Difficulty (replicating Study 2) 1.07 1.79 .038
Note. Contrasts within purpose levels are single-tailed.awareness-raising conditions, ensuring that their differential im-
pact is not driven by differential memory content or differential
affective responses across these conditions.
General discussion
In three studies with different charities, we found that poten-
tial donors' perceptions of how much they remember about a
charity and its cause influence their intended (Studies 1 and
2) and actual (Study 3) charitable giving. When a charity has
a goal of helping people in need, perceptions of good memory
for the cause increase charitable giving; but when a charity has
a goal of raising awareness for a cause, perceptions of good
memory for the cause impair charitable giving. These effects
were reliable for each individual study and combined analyses
(following the adding-z's procedure of Rosenthal, 1978)
result in overall effects of z=2.98, p= .001, for the helping
charities and z=2.89, p=.002, for the awareness-raising chari-
ties. These findings are consistent with the theoretical rationale
developed in other domains (Schwarz, 2004a, 2010) and con-
tribute to our understanding of charitable giving as well as
metacognition.
Implications for metacognition
Our results highlight that consumers' use of metacognitive
experiences as a source of information is sensitive to the specific
context in which they make a decision. The observation that one
remembers a lot about a charity one recently heard about is inher-
ently ambiguous—it may reflect that one found the material per-
sonally important and paid close attention to it or that one had
previously heard about the charity and was already familiar
with some of the material. Which of the underlying lay theories
of memory is likely to come to mind depends on which goal
the charity emphasizes.When the charity aims to raise awareness,
potential donors are likely to assess whether such awareness-
raising is needed. Noting that they know little about the charity,
they may conclude that awareness-raising is indeed required,
563R.W. Smith, N. Schwarz / Journal of Consumer Psychology 22 (2012) 558–564resulting in higher donations when memory is poor rather than
good. When the charity pursues another goal—such as wanting
to help people, animals, or the environment—awareness related
considerations are less likely to come to mind and consumers
may focus on the importance of the cause. In this case, good
memory for details will suggest that one found the charity person-
ally important, resulting in higher donations when memory is
good rather than poor. These context sensitive inferences reflect
a high level of sophistication in thinking about one's own mem-
ory processes and their context specific implications, indicating
that the use of metacognitive experiences as a source of informa-
tion is often part of a thoughtful and deliberate assessment of
the available information in context (Schwarz, 2010).
This analysis may seem more compelling if it were accom-
panied by data that show the implied differences in partici-
pants' perception of the personal importance of the cause or
the need to raise awareness, preferably complete with media-
tion analyses. Unfortunately, such data would be nondiagnos-
tic. First, suppose that we assessed perceived importance at
the end of the experiment, after participants donated. In this
case, the act of donating may itself serve as an input into later
importance judgments, providing apparent evidence for “media-
tion” that may well reflect reverse causality. Alternatively, sup-
pose that we assessed personal importance prior to donations.
In this case, the importance judgment would recruit the corre-
sponding lay theory of memory in all conditions, thus thwarting
the ability to observe goal-contingent differences. Similar consid-
erations apply to measures of the need to raise awareness. As
metacognitive analyses indicate, measurement changes the
thought process and the desire to collect many measures in a
single study is more likely to mislead than to illuminate
(Schwarz, 2010).
Implications for charitable giving
With regard to charitable giving, our findings challenge con-
ventional wisdom: Knowing a lot about a charity and its cause
can hurt rather than help charitable giving, provided the charity
emphasizes awareness-raising as a goal. Hence, awareness-
raising charities face different marketing considerations than
charities that pursue other goals, most notably the relief of
suffering. For both types of charities, a simple truism holds:
to enter a consumer's consideration set, they need to be suffi-
ciently memorable to come to mind when the consumer con-
siders making charitable donations. But once they pass the
threshold of entering the consideration set, both types of chari-
ties differ in whether high memorability helps or hurts their pur-
pose. When the charity aims at relieving suffering, consumers
infer from high knowledge about the charity that they care
about the cause, which increases the likelihood and size of
donations (Studies 1 and 3). But for awareness-raising charities,
high memorability can backfire when consumers infer that
awareness is already high and conclude that additional dona-
tions are not needed. Our findings suggest that this conclusion
comes easily to potential donors (Studies 2 and 3) and does
not require prompts beyond the stated goal of raising
awareness.Hence, the more than 20,000 awareness-raising charities
(Guidestar, 2011) face an important dilemma in their promotion
goals. For example, consider VH1's Save the Music Founda-
tion, which aims to raise “awareness about the importance of
music as part of each child's complete education” (Vh1 Save
the Music, 2011). To acquire the necessary donations, the charity
needs to promote itself to potential donors. However, if the pro-
motions lead potential donors to believe that they are already
familiar with the charity and its cause, they may conclude that
awareness of the need for music education in schools is already
high and choose not to donate. Fortunately, there are several
strategies that Save the Music Foundation can adopt to avoid
this conundrum. First, the organization can attempt to segment
its population of potential donors. Like many awareness-raising
charities, they have multiple goals and could emphasize different
goals for different segments. For existing donors, who are al-
ready familiar with the charity, they might focus on providing
musical instruments to schools; for new potential donors, who
are presumably less familiar with the organization, they could
focus on their awareness-raising goal. This strategy could
allow the charity to take advantage of positive effects of high per-
ceived memory among existing donors as well as of positive
effects of low perceived memory among new potential donors.
Second, for charities that focus exclusively on awareness-
raising, donation appeals should facilitate the attribution that
being highly knowledgeable about the cause is indicative of
one's own personal engagement rather than of broad societal
awareness. Future research may fruitfully test these strategies
and may extend the analysis to other organizations that attempt
to raise awareness, including political interest groups devoted
to changing the public's awareness of specific issues. If success-
fully implemented, either of these strategies would put
awareness-raising organizations in the same situation as other or-
ganizations, allowing them to benefit from the memorability of
their important and worthwhile causes.Future directions
Theoretically, the influence of other metacognitive variables
that can convey that one is or is not highly familiar with a charity
should parallel the impact of perceived memory in the present
studies. Such variables include all manipulations of fluency,
from print fonts to rhyme (for a review see Schwarz, 2004a).
Moreover, the conceptual rationale developed here is not limited
to charities. Other product categories in which extensive promo-
tion can have negative effects include identity signaling products,
for which consumers prefer moderately low societal awareness
(Berger & Heath, 2007), and products that benefit from exclu-
sivity, such as some vacation destinations (Pocheptsova, Labroo,
&Dhar, 2010). If promotion of these products leads to perceptions
of high societal awareness, willingness to buy may suffer.References
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